Constitutional Criminal Procedure by Kirkpatrick, Graham
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 2 
1968 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
Graham Kirkpatrick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Graham Kirkpatrick, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 5 Tulsa L. J. 122 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
VOLU1VIE 5 MAY 1968 NuxBER 2
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
GRAHAM KIRKPATEICK*
A. THE RIGHT TO CouNsEL
1. On trial for a felony and on appeal from a felony con-
viction.
Prior to 1963, the right to counsel in state courts of one
charged with a crime was determined largely by state law.
As late as 1942, in the case of Betts v. Brady,1 the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the robbery conviction in a
Maryland court of an unrepresented defendant. Due to lack
of funds, he had been unable to employ counsel and so in-
formed the judge on arraignment. The defendant requested
that the court appoint counsel to defend him. The judge re-
fused the request, however, on the grounds that it was not
the practice in that county to appoint counsel for indigent
defendants, save in prosecutions for murder and rape.
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wain-
wright.2 The defendant, charged with a felony, had appeared
in a Florida court without funds or a lawyer and requested
counsel to defend him. Florida law permitted appointment
of counsel only when the defendant was accused of a capital
offense. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in
the state prison. The Supreme Court of Florida denied habeas
corpus. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed:
We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption . . . that a
provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental
and essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the
*Professor of Law, University of Tulsa, College of Law.
1316 U.S. 455 (1942).
2372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one
of those fundamental rights. 3
Douglas v. California4 was decided the same day as Gideon.
The defendant, who had been convicted of thirteen felonies,
had requested the trial court to appoint counsel to represent
him on appeal. Pursuant to California law, the court made
an investigation and denied the request for counsel. In re-
versing, the Supreme Court said:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Four-
teenth Amendment where rich man, who appeals as
of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination
into the record, research of the law, and marshalling
of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already
burdened by a preliminary determination that his case
is without merit, is forced to shift for himself.5
The appointment of counsel requirement which Gideon
made applicable in state courts caused substantial revision of
the practice previously followed in many states. The impact
of Gideon was not so great in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Con-
stitution, adopted in 1907, provides that in all criminal prose-
cutions the accused shall have the right to be heard by him-
self and counsel. 6 In the case of Ex parte George,7 the Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals held that a trial court may
lose jurisdiction to pronounce judgment against an accused
if, in the absence of an effective waiver of his right, it fails
to appoint counsel to represent him.
In Brown v. State,8 the Oklahoma court earlier had held
that an accused is entitled to counsel at every stage of the
proceeding, that his constitutional right to be heard by counsel
is not limited to the trial. Thus, it will be seen that Gideon,
8 Id. at 342 (footnote omitted).
4 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
5 Id. at 357-58.
6 OKLA. CONST. art 2, § 20.
7 83 Okla. Crim. 99, 173 P.2d 454 (1946).
8 39 Okla. Crim. 406, 266 P. 476 (1928).
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in effect, merely applied nationally a rule which had been in
effect in Oklahoma since statehood.
In 1964, in order to insure that there would be no doubt
whether an accused had effectively waived his constitutional
right to counsel, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
established guidelines as to what the record must reflect
whenever an accused not represented by counsel wishes to
enter a plea of guilty. In Huggins v. State9 the court said:
[I]n all cases where an accused, not represented by
counsel, enters a plea of guilty and is sentenced on that
plea by the trial judge, the record of the trial proceed-
ing must affirmatively show that the accused knows
and understands the nature of the charge against him,
and the punishment that can be imposed therefor; knows
and understands his constitutional right to be repre-
sented by counsel; knows and understands his right to
be represented by Court appointed counsel, if he is un-
able to employ the same; knows and understands his
right to a trial by Jury. And if the accused does not
desire to be represented by counsel of his own choice or
Court appointed counsel and has entered a plea of guilty
of his own free will and accord, with a full and intelli-
gent understanding of the nature of such waiver, and of
the consequences of such plea in this connection.1 0
2. On trial for a misdemeanor and on appeal from a mis-
demeanor conviction.
The question today is whether the Gideon rule is appli-
cable when the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor.
In 1965, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit extended
Gideon." A defendant had pleaded guilty in a Mississippi
court to the misdemeanor of the unlawful sale of whiskey.
He was fined and sentenced to ninety days in jail. He had
not been informed of his right to counsel nor been repre-
sented by counsel. The court of appeals reversed the district
court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that
1 388 P.2d 341 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964).
10 Id. at 344-45.
1 Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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the state had not accorded the defendant his Constitutional
rights.12
In spite of the rule adopted by the Fifth Circuit, it ap-
pears that the states still have discretion in the assignment
of counsel in misdemeanor cases. This conclusion is based
upon the following developments: The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the case of Winters v. Beck,23 where the defend-
ant had been convicted of a misdemeanor in an Arkansas
court. He had no counsel and was not informed of his right
to counsel in' the state court. Again in 1966, the Court denied
certiorari in DeJoseph v. Connecticut4 where the defendant
had been convicted of a misdemeanor in a state court. On
trial he had no counsel nor funds to provide counsel. He re-
quested the court to assign counsel, but the request was
ignored.
A second question concerns the right to counsel in the
appeal of misdemeanor convictions. The Court plainly indi-
cated in Douglas v. California5 that a convicted felon is en-
titled to appointed counsel on appeal; but the Court has not
been specific where appeal of misdemeanor convictions are
involved. Perhaps this lack of definiteness can be attributed
to the fact that, as of this date, the question has not been
squarely before the Court for decision. On the other hand, a
recent Michigan decision may indicate the development of a
trend in this area. A defendant had been convicted of a mis-
demeanor and sentenced to ninety days in the house of cor-
rection. After serving this sentence, he was remanded to the
state prison, as a parole violator, to serve the remainder of a
felony sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the
12The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the position taken in Harvey
v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965), in McDonald v.
Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
1:385 U.S. 907 (1966).
14385 U.S. 982 (1966).
15372 U.S. 353 (1963).
4
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defendant was entitled to appointment of counsel to appeal
the misdemeanor conviction.'8
Since the preparation of an appeal, including briefs and
arguments, requires more technical knowledge of law and pro-
cedure than is required to represent oneself in a trial court
when accused of a misdemeanor, it is predicted that, when
the question is squarely presented, the Supreme Court will
hold that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointment of
counsel to represent him on appeal.
3. At a preliminary judicial proceeding.
Prior to 1965, it was generally accepted that if a witness
testified against an accused on preliminary hearing and his
testimony was either cross-examined or subject to cross-
examination, the testimony would be admissible against the
accused on trial on the merits in the event the witness was
unable to attend and testify in person. This practice was dis-
carded by the Supreme Court in Pointer v. Texas.17 In that
case the petitioner and another were arrested and taken be-
fore a state judge for a preliminary hearing on a charge of
robbery by violence. Neither of the defendants had a lawyer.
The victim was chief witness for the state, but Pointer did
not attempt to cross-examine him. It was said, however, that
he did attempt to cross-examine other witnesses at the hear-
ing. The victim moved to California. On trial on the merits
and over the objections of Pointer's attorney, whom he had
acquired by trial time, the victim's testimony recorded at
the preliminary hearing was admitted. The trial judge took
the attitude that Pointer had been present at the preliminary
hearing and, therefore, had been accorded an opportunity
of cross-examining witnesses against him. This ruling was in
accord with the generally accepted view prevailing at the
time.
16 People v. Mallory, 378 Mich. 538, 147 N.W.2d 66 (1967).
17380 U.S. 400 (1965).
5
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The* Supreme Court reversed, saying:
[T]his right [to cross-examine witnesses] appears in the
Sixth Amendment .... [W]e have expressly declared
that to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine
the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process of law....
... [S]ince Gideon v. Wainwright... it no longer
can broadly be said that the Sixth Amendment does not
apply to state courts....
... [T]he Sixth Amendment's guarantee of confron-
tation and cross-examination was unquestionably denied
petitioner in this case .... The case before us would
be quite a different one had Phillips' statement been
taken at a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had
been represented by counsel who had been given a com-
plete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine.1 8
The rule of the Pointer case is clear and unmistakable.
Where a witness testifies against an accused on preliminary
hearing, or at any stage prior to trial, that testimony will be
inadmissible at the principal trial unless the defendant had
been represented by counsel who had an opportunity to
cross-examine.
4. At a Police line-up.
Prior to June 12, 1967, the identification of an accused in
a police line-up was admissible against him at his trial,
even if he had not been represented by counsel at the line-up.
The cases of United States v. Wade1 9 and Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia2O changed this prevailing rule. In Wade the Supreme
Court held that a post-indictment, pre-trial line-up, at which
the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses, is a critical
stage of the criminal prosecution; that police conduct of such
a line-up without notice to, and in the absence of his counsel,
denies the accused his sixth amendment right to counsel and
calls in question the admissibility at trial of the in-court
18 1d. at 404-07.
19 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
20 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
6
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identification of the accused by witnesses who attended the
line-up. The same principle was applied in the Gilbert case.
Therefore where a witness who had previously identified the
accused in an illegal pre-trial line-up again identifies the ac-
cused in court, the in-court identification will be admissable
only if it can be shown to be based upon matter independent
of and not tainted by the illegal line-up.21
B. CoNFsIows AND SELF INcRmnNATION
1. Unnecessary delay.
For many years, it was accepted in all jurisdictions that
the test for admissibility of a confession was whether it was
voluntary.
Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that an arresting officer shall take the person ar-
rested without unnecessary delay before the nearest avail-
able commissioner or other officer empowered to commit
persons charged with offenses against the United States. On
arraignment, the commissioner shall inform the person of
the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel, of
his right to a preliminary examination, and that he is not
required to make a statement but that any statement made
may be used against him.
The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction
for rape in Mallory v. United States.22 Although magistrates
were readily available, Mallory was arraigned only after six
hours of questioning, a lie detector test and his confession.
The Court held that the arraignment was not without un-
necessary delay; in effect it promulgated the rule that con-
fessions secured prior to arraignment are inadmissible.
21 This principle is not retroactive, however. Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
22 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
2 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 176 (1961).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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The Mallory rule has not been made applicable to the
states. However, a review of state cases since Mallory leads
to a conclusion that it has had an effect upon state decisions.
For example, Oklahoma for years has required an officer
making a felony arrest to take the accused before a magis-
trate23 without delay.24 Another Oklahoma statute declares
that an officer who wilfully fails to take an arrested person
before a magistrate is guilty of a misdemeanor. 25 Until re-
cently these statutes have been generally ignored although
Oklahoma courts have given lip service to the doctrine that
unnecessary delay in taking an arrested person before a
magistrate violates his statutory and constitutional rights.
They have, however, been hesitant in nailing down con-
clusively the period of time beyond which a delay would be
unreasonable. The case of Benton v. State,26 decided by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in 1948 is illustrative
of the language used: "The delay, herein involved, consti-
tutes a violation of the defendant's statutory rights ...
Under these provisions it was the duty of the arresting officer
to have taken the defendant before a magistrate without
delay."2 7 In Benton the court held that detention from May
22 to June 11 was unreasonable and that a confession made
during that time should not have been used to support the
conviction. In 1960, twelve days was held to be unreasonable,2 8
and in 1963, eight days.29 These two cases, decided after the
Mallory case, indicate a decided scaling down in the num-
ber of days an officer may delay in taking an accused before
a magistrate and still use a confession made during the de-
lay. Would the Oklahoma court deny admission of a confes-
sion obtained during a six hour delay as the federal courts
must do under the Mallory rule? Probably not, if the con-
24 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 181 (1961).
2r5 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 534 (1961).
28186 Okla. Crim. 137, 190 P.2d 168 (1948).
27 Id. at 157-58, 190 P.2d at 177.
28 In re Fowler, 356 P.2d 770 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960).
29 Brown v. State, 384 P.2d 54 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963).
8
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fession is voluntary. Of course since Miranda v. Arizona,80
a confession made prior to the accused being warned of
his rights, and without a waiver, would be inadmissible. It is
predicted that the Mallory decision will continue to have
more influence on reducing the time that officers may delay
taking an accused before a magistrate after arrest.
2. Denial of Access to Counsel.
In 1964, the Supreme Court decided in Escobedo v. Illi-
noissl that the refusal by police to honor defendant's re-
quest to consult with his attorney during the course of in-
terrogation constituted a denial of the assistance of counsel
in violation of the sixth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, as made obligatory upon the states by the
fourteenth amendment.
We hold.., that where, as here, the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect
has been taken into police custody, the police carry out
a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and
has been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him
of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the
accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel"
in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion as "made obligatory upon the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment" . . . and that no statement elicited
by the police during the interrogation may be used
against him at a criminal trial 32
Considerable confusion resulted from the Escobedo de-
cision as to exactly how far the Court intended to go. This
confusion was dispelled by Miranda v. Arizona.33
[W]hen an individual is taken into custody, or other-
3o 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31378 U.S. 478 (1964).32 Id. at 490-91, quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
342 (1963).
3s 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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wise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any
significant way and is subjected to questioning, the
privilege against self incrimination is jeopardized. Pro-
cedural safeguards must be employed to protect the
privilege, and unless other fully effective means are
adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and
to assure that the exercise of the right will be scru-
pulously honored, the following measures are required.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Oppor-
tunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have
been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the in-
dividual may knowingly and intelligently waive these
rights and agree to answer questions or make a state-
ment. But unless and until such warnings and waiver
are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evi-
dence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against him.34
3. Spontaneous confessions and admissions.
The Supreme Court has not yet been called on to pass
upon the admissibility of spontaneous confessions and admis-
sions. The question was faced by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, however, in Pitman v. United States.35 A
bank in Las Vegas, Nevada, had been robbed. A deputy sheriff
had his attention directed by a bystander to the defendant
who was sitting in a station wagon. He told defendant to put
his hands where they could be seen and opened the car door.
Immediately, defendant stepped out of the car and, without
any questioning from the deputy, said: "I am the fellow you
are looking for; I heisted the bank. The money and the gun
are right here."30 Defendant pointed into the car and in clear
84 1d. at 478-79 (footnote omitted).
35 380 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1967).
861d. at 370.
10
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view was an open plastic bag containing currency and an auto-
matic pistol. Defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and placed
in the patrol car. The court held that, even though the ac-
cused had not been warned of his constitutional rights when
he told the deputy sheriff that he had robbed the bank, in-
asmuch as the statements were spontaneous, were made be-
fore any questioning and were entirely voluntary, they were
admissible.
4. Refusal to testify.
In the case of Spevack v. Klein, 7 the Supreme Court ex-
tended the principle of Mallory v. Hogan 8 to attorneys. In
a judicial inquiry as a part of disciplinary proceedings, the
petitioner, a member of the New York Bar, refused to pro-
duce demanded financial records or to testify on the grounds
that the production of the records and his testimony would
tend to incriminate him. The Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court ordered the petitioner disbarred, hold-
ing that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was not available to him in the light of the decision in
Cohen v. Hurley.39 The Supreme Court reversed. Mr. Justice
Douglas said:
And so the question emerges whether the principle
of Mallory v. Hogan is inapplicable because petitioner is
a member of the Bar. We conclude that Cohen v. Hur-
ley should be overruled, that the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in
the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers
as well as to other individuals, and that it should not
be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbar-
ment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price
for asserting it.4 °
37 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
38 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
39 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
40 385 U.S. at 514 (Opinion of Douglas, J., in which the Chief
Justice and Black and Brennan, JJ., concurred. Fortas, J.
concurred in the result.)
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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There is little doubt that the Spevak case will cause con-
siderable revision in disciplinary practice of bar associations
in the future.
5. Eavesdropping, wiretapping and informers.
In some cases self-incrimination may arise from the use
by law officers of eavesdroppers or informers. In Silverman
v. United States41 an unanimous Court held that listening to
incriminating conversations within a house by inserting an
electronic device, a so-called "spike mike", into a party wall
and making contact with a heating duct, thus converting the
entire heating system into a conductor of sound, violated
petitioner's protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
The incriminating matter thus secured was inadmissible on
trial. The prohibition against unlawful search and seizure
is the determining factor in many of the eavesdropping and
informer cases. A few of these cases are included to round
out the discussion of confessions, because the evidence secured
by means of eavesdropping, wiretapping, or the use of in-
formers is generally in the nature of an admission against
interest which, if it cannot in every case be said to amount
technically to a confession, closely approximates one.
In Clinton v. Virginia,42 the defendent had contended in
the state courts that it was reversible error to admit evidence
obtained by means of a mechanical device stuck in the par-
tition of an adjoining apartment. The spiked device used by
the state police was not driven into the wall, but was stuck in
it. Virginia's highest court affirmed defendant's conviction on
the grounds that the Silverman case was factually different,
that the eavesdropping was not accomplished through an
unauthorized penetration into the premises occupied by the
defendant. The Supreme Court reversed. The view of the
Court today apparently was summed up by Mr. Justice
41364 U.S. 505 (1961).
42 377 U.S. 158 (1964), rev'g 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963).
12
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Douglas in his concurring opinion in the Silverman case,
when he said:
Our concern should not be with the trivialities of the
local law of trespass, as the opinion of the Court indi-
cates. But neither should the command of the Fourth
Amendment be limited by nice distinctions turning on
the kind of electronic equipment employed. Rather our
sole concern should be with whether the privacy of the
home was invaded.43
In Goldman v. United States, 44 federal officers were per-
mitted to use evidence obtained by placing a dictaphone
against the wall of a private office. Later cases have dealt
with an invasion of the privacy of the home, rather than of
a place of business. The constitutional requirements in this
area are not entirely free from doubt. In Silverman and
Clinton, the Court refers to protecting the privacy of the
home rather than to the technical laws of trespass. Neverthe-
less, one cannot avoid noticing that some of the members
of the Court were concerned that the devices used in fact
constituted a trespass against the property. Yet the Court
has not said that the sole concern is protecting the privacy
of the home.
Where wiretapping is concerned, as in the case of eaves-
dropping, courts generally apply the prohibition against un-
lawful searches and seizures. Again, as in the case of eaves-
dropping, the evidence secured by wiretapping is in the na-
ture of an admission against interest, analogous to a con-
fession. In 1928, the Supreme Court held that messages pass-
ing over telephone wires are not within the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure.
The [fourth] Amendment itself shows that the search
is to be of material things-the person, the house, his
papers or his effects.... The evidence was secured by
the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was
43 365 U.S. at 513 (concurring opinion).
44 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants....
The intervening wires are not part of his house or office...45
It has not been necessary for the Court to re-examine
this position. The Court has relied upon the Federal Com-
munications Act 46 to dispose of wiretapping cases that have
arisen since 1934. The Act expressly prohibits intercepting
a communication and divulging it. In Benati v. United States,47
the Supreme Court excluded evidence secured by wiretapping.
It said: "[C]onfronted as we are by this clear statute, and rest-
ing our decision on its provisions, it is neither necessary nor
appropriate to discuss by analogy distinctions suggested to
be applicable to the Fourth Amendment. [It] contains an
express, absolute prohibition against the divulgence of inter-
cepted communications." The Department of Justice and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation have taken the position that
the Act does not prohibit wiretapping, but only tapping fol-
lowed by divulging the information gained.
Berger v. New York 49 is another important eavesdrop-
ping case. Pursuant to the provisions of a New York statute,5 0
an ex parte eavesdropping order was secured from a trial
court permitting the installation of a recording device in a
described office for a sixty day period. After two weeks, use
of the device uncovered a conspiracy involving the issuance
of liquor licenses and resulted in the indictment of the de-
fendant as a go-between for the principal conspirators. The
statute was held to be unconstitutional since it failed to meet
the particularity requirements of the fourth amendment, both
as to the specific crime involved and the particular conversa-
tions sought. In effect, all the statute required was an assur-
41 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1928).
46 Federal Communications Act of 1934 § 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1964).
4T 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
48 Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).
49 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
G0N. Y. CODE CmM. PROC. § 813-a (McKinney Supp 1967).
14
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ance from the applicant that evidence of some crime might
result; this was too broad an authorization. Since the Court
did not specifically foreclose the possibility that a constitu-
tional eavesdropping statute may be drawn, it will be in-
teresting to see if the New York legislature can remedy the
defects in its statute, and if so, the treatment it will be ac-
corded by the Court.
The Court upheld, however, in Lopez v. United States, 1
a non-telephonic, electronic eavesdropping. An Internal Reve-
nue agent, instructed by his superiors to "pretend to play along
with the scheme," met petitioner in the latter's office. He
recorded bribe offers by means of a pocket wire-recorder
hidden on his person. A majority of the Court rejected the
theory that the agent gained access to petitioner's office by
misrepresentation in falsifying his mission, consequently the
conversation with him was not illegally seized. The majority
reasoned: "[T]he device was not planted by means of an un-
lawful physical invasion of petitioner's premises under circum-
stances which would violate the Fourth Amendment. It was
carried in and out by an agent who was there with petitioner's
assent, and it neither saw nor heard more than the agent him-
self."52
Informers report statements or commitments are in most
instances damaging admissions, and if not actually classifi-
able as confessions closely approximate them. In Lewis V.
United States,53 an undercover Federal Narcotics agent had
gained access to defendant's home to purchase marihuana. The
agent initially contacted defendant by telephone, using a
false name and stating that they had a mutual friend. The
defendant contended that absent a search warrant, any of-
ficial instrusion upon the privacy of his home constituted a
fourth amendment violation. The Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction and quoted with approval the conclusion of
51 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
52 1d. at 439.
53385 U.S. 206 (1966).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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the government's brief:
In short, this case involves the issue of no governmental
power to intrude upon protected premises; the visitor
was invited and willingly admitted by the suspect. It
concerns no design on the part of a government agent to
observe or hear what was happening in the privacy of a
home .... [T]he only statements repeated were those
that were willingly made to the agent and the only
things taken were the packets of marihuana voluntarily
transferred to him. The pretense resulted in no breach of
privacy; it merely encouraged the suspect to say things
which he was willing and anxious to say to anyone who
would be interested in purchasing marihuana.54
In Hojfa v. United States 55 the Supreme Court approved
the use of a compensated government informer. The informer
became a member of the party of the defendant during the
latter's first criminal trial, and he made frequent reports to
federal officials of defendant's conversations and endeavors to
bribe members of the jury. The Court held that the informer's
presence in the defendant's hotel room did not constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment, that the defendant had invited the informer to
his room, but made the mistake of misplaced confidence. Nor
was defendant's fifth amendment right against self incrimi-
nation violated since his statements were not coerced, legally
or factually. The Court also held without merit the defend-
ant's claim that the sixth amendment was violated. It re-
jected defendant's arguments that the intrusion of the in-
former infringed upon his right confidentially to prepare for
trial with counsel and that the defendant should have been
advised of his right to counsel, since the informer had suf-
ficient information to justify his arrest. The Court also held
that there was no violation of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment, but that the use of a government informer
was a legitimate tool in discovering covert criminal activities.
5Id. at 212.
15 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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